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JUSTIFYING PERCEPTIONS IN FIRST
AND SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
ERIC M. RUBEN∗
I
INTRODUCTION
Public perceptions motivate policymakers. They regulate to preserve certain
perceptions, such as that of a fair judiciary, and to prevent others, such as public
offense. They also respond when the public perceives a danger—for example,
from gun violence. But what is the role of perceptions in defending regulations
challenged as violating constitutional rights? Intuition may suggest that trying to
shape perceptions should have a minimal role, if any at all, in the constitutional
analysis. But existing doctrines paint a more nuanced picture, sometimes
categorically rejecting and other times permitting shaping perceptions as a valid
reason to regulate.
Legal scholarship has explored the interplay between public perception and
the law,1 but has not compared the ways First and Second Amendment doctrine
Copyright © 2017 by Eric M. Ruben.
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
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1. The literature is dense, and this footnote can only capture some notable exemplars. Amitai
Aviram has observed that laws can “manipulate” risk perceptions in ways that contribute to social
welfare, though he takes no normative view on that phenomenon. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of
Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006). Adam M. Samaha
offers an insightful theoretical framework for assessing “appearance justifications” for policies such as
campaign finance limits and broken windows policing. See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of
Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563 (2012). Expressive theories of law focus on how the law expresses
values and attitudes—which of course can influence public perceptions. They have been used to justify,
among other things, doctrine implementing the Equal Protection Clause, which according to expressive
theories precludes government policies “express[ing] a divisive conception of citizens—a conception that
represents their racial, ethnic, religious, or other parochial identities as more important than their
common identity as citizens of the United States.” Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1533–34 (2000). But see Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (critiquing
expressive theories of law). This article discusses several specific areas where public perceptions animate
policymaking. A notable area that is not covered in detail herein, but which has been addressed in other
scholarship, is regulating the electoral system to avoid the perception of corruption. Nathaniel Persily,
Kelli Lammie, and Stephen Ansolabehere have used empirical evidence to explore (and challenge)
whether regulating the campaign finance system or requiring voter identification actually affect the
public’s perception of corruption. Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2004);
Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public
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treat perception-based justifications. This article begins to fill that gap. The
comparison is increasingly relevant after the Supreme Court’s landmark Second
Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller2 because courts are
looking to the First Amendment for guidance as they implement the right to keep
and bear arms.3 Thus, it makes sense to consider the two Amendments in tandem
even if, as this article concludes, the comparison highlights reasons to treat them
differently.
Categorical rules in First Amendment free speech doctrine block regulations
intended to influence certain perceptions. To take one example, the government
generally cannot regulate speech simply because it would be perceived as
offensive.4 Yet regulating speech to influence other perceptions is not
categorically barred. Preserving certain public perceptions, like that of judicial
integrity, can justify speech regulations under heightened scrutiny without the
need to prove actual harm—imminent or otherwise—to a fair justice system.5
In the Second Amendment context, meanwhile, as doctrine has developed in
the nine years since the Supreme Court articulated an individual right to keep
and bear arms in Heller,6 some courts have accepted preserving perceived safety
from armed violence as a legitimate reason to regulate. Most prominently, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a ban on assault weapons and large capacity magazines
in part because the ban “reduces the perceived risk from a mass shooting, and
makes the public feel safer as a result.”7 The validity of that objective was
questioned, including by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, who
dissented from the denial of certiorari in the case.8 What role, if any, the
perception of safety should play in Second Amendment analysis is an open issue,
ripe for scholarly attention.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part II sets the stage by defining
“perception,” and observing how in circumstances in which no constitutional
Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2008) (using
survey evidence to suggest that voter identification requirements would not improve the perception of
electoral integrity, in contrast to arguments made by litigants, and later the Supreme Court, in Crawford
v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008)).
2. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
3. See id. at 595, 635; see also Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1264 (D.C.
Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010); Parker v.
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
4. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
6. 554 U.S. 570.
7. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015); see also Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 792 (C.D. Ill. 2016).
8. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); see also Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 636 F.
App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016); Friedman, 784 F.3d at 420 (Manion, J., dissenting); NRA ILA, Gun Ban
Upheld, Federal Appellate Court Uses “Feelings” To Justify It, DAILY CALLER (May 4, 2015, 4:52 PM),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/05/04/gun-ban-upheld-federal-appellate-court-uses-feelings-to-justify-it/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/38WN-DHYJ].
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right is implicated deferential standards of review are generally indifferent to
whether regulations are intended to shape perceptions.
Part III turns to speech regulations, where limiting speech to shape
perceptions has been declared categorically unconstitutional, but only in certain
circumstances. Part III considers one theory of First Amendment doctrine—that
its goal is to smoke out ideological censorship9—which may explain the seemingly
inconsistent approach.
Part IV shifts to consider firearm restrictions intended to preserve the
perception of safety. Second Amendment doctrine has not settled the question
of when, if ever, influencing perceptions can justify arms restrictions, and courts
will look to the First Amendment for doctrinal guidance. First Amendment
doctrine likely would reject preserving the perception of safety as a valid
regulatory objective for a speech restriction. But historical weapons regulations
and distinct Second Amendment values and risks suggest that perceived safety
has a more legitimate regulatory role in the firearm context. Part IV concludes
by discussing some pragmatic considerations, like avoiding baseless perceptions,
which may limit when and how perceived safety can justify a gun safety
regulation.
II
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND NON-RIGHTS-INFRINGING REGULATION
“Perception” is a broad term that calls for an operable definition. This part
provides one before observing how in a wide array of government actions not
triggering heightened judicial scrutiny, perceptions can and do animate
regulation without presenting constitutional difficulties.
A. Defining Perception
“Perception” is used consistently in both legal and common parlance to mean
“[a]n observation, awareness, or realization, usu[ally] based on physical sensation
or experience; appreciation or cognition.”10 Perception is ubiquitous in human
experience. When a person hears controversial speech, the person may perceive
the speech to be offensive.11 When a person observes judicial candidates soliciting
election contributions, the person may perceive corruption in the judiciary.12

9. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
10. Perception, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Perception, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/140560 [https://perma.cc/SPQ8-PJAF] (last visited Aug.
9, 2016) (defining “perception, n.” to mean “[t]he process of becoming aware or conscious of a thing or
things in general; the state of being aware; consciousness; (spiritual) understanding”); Perception,
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1999) (defining “perception” as “the act or
faculty of apprehending by means of the senses or the mind; cognition; awareness”).
11. See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text (discussing case law regarding restrictions on
offensive speech).
12. See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing case law regarding restrictions on
judicial speech).
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When a person believes a stranger is carrying a firearm, the person may perceive
danger.13 When a person considers a regulatory regime aimed at a risk, the person
may perceive the community to be safer because of the regulation.14
Perceptions have consequences, which is one reason why they factor into
regulatory choices. The person perceiving a comment to be offensive may
become upset or confront the speaker. The person perceiving judicial corruption
may lose faith in our systems of government or not pursue a legal claim in court.
The person perceiving danger because a stranger may be carrying a gun may
leave the area or suppress valuable, but controversial speech that could provoke
the stranger. The person perceiving a safer community because of a regulation
may have more confidence that the government is doing its job and may feel
greater liberty because of the regulation.
Perceptions, moreover, frequently are based on “the actor’s knowledge of the
actual circumstances”15 and are accurate proxies for reality. A judge accepting
campaign contributions may, in fact, be more prone to partiality in a subsequent
case. A perception can even be lifesaving. Psychologist Paul Slovic has observed
that “[t]he ability to sense and avoid harmful environmental conditions is
necessary for the survival of all living organisms.”16 The suspected gun carrier
may be armed and dangerous, presenting an increased risk of serious harm.
On the flip side, perceptions can be imperfect, misconstruing observations or
exaggerating the extent of a risk.17 In part, this can reflect incomplete information
and mental shortcuts derived from personal experience, education, and cultural
norms.18 The judge soliciting donations may not become corrupt and the
suspected gun carrier may not be ill-intentioned or irresponsible.
The inconsistent correlation between perceptions and reality has led some
commentators to prefer a more scientific approach to regulation than one
responding to perceptions.19 But the Constitution does not always mandate that
approach and perceptions often inform policymaking.

13. See infra notes 162, 163, and 189 and accompanying text (discussing survey results about
perceived safety and public carry).
14. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing example of regulatory regimes intended, at
least in part, to make public feel safer).
15. BLACK’S, supra note 10.
16. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 220 (2000).
17. See BLACK’S, supra note 10 (noting that perceptions can be based on an actor’s “erroneous but
reasonable belief in the existence of nonexistent circumstances”).
18. One mental shortcut that is frequently discussed in the literature on risk perceptions is the
“availability heuristic”: “people think a risk is more serious if an example can be readily brought to
mind.” Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2002) (reviewing SLOVIC,
supra note 16); see also id. at 1125–28 (discussing the availability heuristic as part of the review). This
mental shortcut may explain why infrequent, highly salient events, like school shootings, play such a large
role in public risk perceptions. For one discussion of how cultural norms may affect risk perceptions, see
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk
Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 18.
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B. Perception-Based Regulations Not In Tension With Constitutional Rights
Responding to “common concerns and preserving the general tranquility” is
a central goal of our system of democratic government,20 which necessarily
requires government officials to be attentive to how the public perceives the
world. Constitutional jurisprudence, thus, does not prevent most policies based
on (or seeking to preserve or shape) perceptions. Absent circumstances that
trigger “more searching judicial inquiry,”21 most laws aimed at that objective
must only pass the rational basis test. So long as the government can show that
legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, the law
surpasses the basic constitutional threshold. That, of course, is a low bar.22
Frequently, there is nothing “illegitimate” or “irrational” about regulating to
shape perceptions. Many examples exist of non-rights infringing policies
intended, at least in part, to change or preserve public perceptions, and that
objective does not undermine their constitutionality.23
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[I]f it be
possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and
preserving the general tranquillity, it must . . . be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears
of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the
human heart.”).
21. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). According to Carolene
Products, three categories of policies call for “more searching judicial inquiry”: those (1) “within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,” (2) that “restrict[]
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation,” or (3) that are “directed at . . . discrete and insular minorities.” Id.
22. The Supreme Court has described rational basis review as “a paradigm of judicial restraint . . . .
[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–315 (1993).
23. The regulation of hazardous waste through the Superfund statute provides one oft-cited
example. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012)).
Extensive commentary addresses how the law and related regulations were in part a response to public
perceptions. See, e.g., DIV. OF ENVTL. HEALTH ASSESSMENT, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOVE
CANAL FOLLOW-UP HEALTH STUDY 15 (2008) (“It was difficult to conclude from the results of these
efforts, however, whether exposure to chemical wastes dumped at Love Canal was associated with any
adverse health effects.”); LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES . . . 51 (1998)
(describing studies showing no health effects from hazardous waste in Love Canal, New York as “a bunch
of baloney”); AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? (1995); Gina Bari Kolata, Love Canal: False Alarm
Caused by Botched Study, 208 SCIENCE 1239 (1980); see also EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 96-97 (1987) (noting that the
Environmental Protection Agency’s “priorities appear more closely aligned with public opinion than with
estimated risks,” with the top public concern being chemical waste disposal). That fact, however, does
not affect the policies’ constitutionality under deferential standards of review. For example, courts have
rejected challenges to the retroactive imposition of costs and the classification of chemicals as
“hazardous” under the Superfund regime in conclusory fashion, simply noting that such government
action is not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious. See, e.g., Hüls Am. Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 453 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency must show only that there “might” be “a
significant health hazard for the surrounding community . . . no matter how remote the possibility” in
order to classify a substance as “extremely hazardous” in a way that is not “arbitrary and capricious”);
United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733–34 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984)) (rejecting a challenge to retroactive imposition
of costs noting that “judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province
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The role of public perceptions in animating or justifying a policy achieves
more doctrinal significance, however, when the law or regulation is in tension
with constitutional rights, such as the rights to free speech and to keep and bear
arms. The following discussion considers those circumstances.
III
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
Intuitively and in practice, a law justified by its effect on public perceptions is
scrutinized much more closely when a constitutional right is implicated. The
judiciary plays a gatekeeping role in that situation through judge-made doctrines
designed to weed out unconstitutional infringements.24 First Amendment free
speech doctrine applies a “mix of balancing and categorical tests” to determine
the scope of protected conduct and whether regulating protected conduct is
constitutionally permitted.25 Significantly, categorical tests sometimes reject and
other times permit shaping public perceptions as a legitimate rationale for
regulating speech. Regulating speech to prevent offensiveness is generally off
limits, but with longstanding exceptions, such as when the speech is classified as
“fighting words” or the audience is captive. Shaping other perceptions,
meanwhile, like those relating to the integrity of the judiciary or food safety, have
not been categorically proscribed and have justified speech regulations under
heightened scrutiny. This part explores a few ways First Amendment doctrine
deals with perception-based justifications.
A. Offensiveness, Integrity, And Dissonant Tests For Perceptions In Speech
Cases
Nowhere is First Amendment doctrine more categorically skeptical of
restricting speech to influence public perceptions than when the perception at
issue is offensiveness. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,26 the Court stated
categorically that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it.”27 Pacifica considered a lawsuit against a
of the legislative and executive branches”).
24. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1031 (1971)
(quoting James Madison, House of Representatives Debates (June 8, 1789)) (“If [rights] are incorporated
into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive [branch] . . . .”).
25. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U.L. REV. 375, 379 (2009). Professor Joseph Blocher described:
Generally, balancing approaches set the individual’s interest in asserting a right against the
government’s interest in regulating it, attach whatever weights are appropriate for the context,
and determine which is weightier. In contrast, categoricalism prohibits this kind of weighing of
interests in the individual case and asks only whether the case falls inside certain predetermined,
outcome-determinative lines.
Id. at 381.
26. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
27. Id. at 745.
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broadcaster for airing George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue in violation of
a restriction on “indecent” material.28 Although the Court upheld the regulation
on narrow grounds,29 it declared a general rule that offensiveness is off limits as
a regulatory justification. The Court explained its rule as reflecting the “central
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas.”30
Other First Amendment cases similarly suggest that perceptions—especially
those related to offensiveness—cannot justify a speech restriction. In Boos v.
Barry,31 the Supreme Court viewed with extreme skepticism the proposition that
the government had a constitutionally salient interest in “shield[ing] diplomats
from speech that offends their dignity.”32 The Court struck down a law
prohibiting signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that tended to bring a
foreign government into “public disrepute,” refusing to make exceptions where
a foreign diplomat, as opposed to any other person, was the target of insulting
speech.33 Although couched in a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court relied on
categorical reasoning about its “longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because
the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience”
and the need to provide “adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment.”34
Similarly, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,35 the Court struck down
a permitting scheme for demonstrations that granted discretion to a local official
to adjust a fee depending on anticipated expenses for maintaining public order.36
The Nationalist Movement desired to protest the federal holiday honoring
Martin Luther King, Jr. and sued Forsyth County after being charged a $100 fee.37
Ruling in favor of the Nationalist Movement, the Court noted that the mere fact
that speech “might offend a hostile mob” could not save the content-based
restriction.38

28. Id. at 729–30.
29. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
30. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745–46.
31. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
32. Id. at 320.
33. Id. at 322.
34. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988)). Falwell, and later
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), shielded defendants from tort liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In both cases, it was alleged that the defendants’ non-violent but highly offensive
expressive conduct caused emotional anguish, but the Court protected the conduct, holding that speech
generally cannot be restricted solely because it is upsetting or even hurtful. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458;
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745–46).
35. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
36. Id. at 124–25.
37. Id. at 127.
38. Id. at 134–35; see also id. at 142 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion as
rejecting a “kind of ‘heckler’s veto’”).
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Brandenburg v. Ohio39 has implications for the perception of safety and thus
is important for comparing First and Second Amendment doctrine. In that case,
the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a leader in the Ku Klux Klan for
advocating violence at a rally, holding that advocacy cannot be proscribed
because it encourages violence “except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless activity and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”40 Perceived risk of harm, in other words, would be insufficient. Any
other standard “sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution
has immunized from governmental control.”41
The cases discussed thus far exemplify situations in which First Amendment
doctrine rejects perception-based justifications, but in other contexts, doctrine
accepts influencing perceptions as a legitimate reason to regulate speech.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,42 for example, held that a State lawfully can
punish offensive speech rising to the level of “‘fighting’ words,” or “those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.”43 Such speech falls outside the protection of the First Amendment
altogether.44 Other exceptions to the ordinary rule against prohibiting speech
perceived as offensive include libels45 and obscenity46 which, along with fighting
words, have long been subject to regulation.47 Pacifica established a further
distinction, when “[p]atently offensive” speech is broadcast into the home so as
to confront a listener without warning.48
Although Pacifica involved offensive speech in “the privacy of the home,” a
realm treated specially across doctrines,49 the Supreme Court has also allowed
perceived offensiveness to factor into First Amendment analysis outside the
home. In Hill v. Colorado,50 offensiveness gained constitutional salience in a
sensitive context (protests and “sidewalk counseling” outside abortion clinics)
where hearing the speech was unavoidable.51 At issue was a ban on protesters or
“counselors” approaching within eight feet of another person near the entrance
to a medical facility.52 The Court noted favorably the State’s interest in protecting
39. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 447.
41. Id. at 448.
42. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
43. Id., at 571–72.
44. See Kagan, supra note 9, at 416.
45. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
47. In Chaplinsky, the Court noted that these restrictions “have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.” Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
48. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978).
49. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1304–10 (2009) (describing “the home’s constitutional preeminence”).
50. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
51. Id. at 708.
52. Id. at 707. Specifically, the ban applied within 100 feet of the entrance and was motivated by
protesters at abortion clinics. Id.; see also id. at 715 (“[T]he legislative history makes it clear that [the
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patients from “the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an
unwelcome individual delivers a message (whatever its context) by physically
approaching an individual at close range.”53 The Court observed that “the
protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive
speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”54
Pacifica and Hill represent exceptions to the categorical rule that applies
when offensiveness is invoked to justify speech restrictions. Perceptions other
than offensiveness, however, face no categorical restriction. In Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar,55 the Supreme Court considered the government’s interest in
preserving the “public perception of judicial integrity” in the context of a Florida
bar association rule prohibiting judges from personally soliciting campaign
funds.56 Even though “[t]he concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does
not easily reduce to precise definition [or] lend itself to proof by documentary
record,” the Court concluded that it was a “genuine and compelling” interest and
rejected the challenge after applying heightened scrutiny.57
United States v. Alvarez58 similarly considered the perception of integrity, this
time of military awards. At issue was whether the Stolen Valor Act, which
proscribed falsely claiming receipt of a military decoration, violated the First
Amendment.59 The government defended the law as a means of preserving the
“public’s general perception of military awards,”60 which a plurality deemed
“beyond question” and “compelling.”61 The Court ultimately declared the
content-based regulation unconstitutional, however, because the government
failed to present evidence that the Act actually furthered its legitimate interest.62
The opinion repeated many principles regarding protecting unpopular
viewpoints,63 raising the specter that the Court suspected that the true purpose of
law’s] enactment was primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”).
53. Id. at 718 n.25.
54. Id. at 716. This exception to the normal rule also was applied in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
in which the Court accepted the government’s interest “to retain the character of the Sheep Meadow [in
Central Park] and its more sedate activities” as “significant” and content-neutral, upholding regulations
on sound amplification at a nearby bandshell. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796
(1989).
55. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
56. Id. at 1662, 1666. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a four-judge plurality, applied strict scrutiny
to the restriction. Id. at 1665 (plurality opinion). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg would have applied a less
exacting scrutiny. Id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 1667 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“States have a
compelling interest in seeking to ensure the appearance . . . of an impartial judiciary . . . .”); id. at 1685
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Florida has a compelling interest in making sure that . . . its citizens have no good
reason to lack confidence that its courts are performing their proper role.”). Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, “accept[ed] for the sake of argument that States have a compelling interest in ensuring
that its judges are seen to be impartial.” Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2549 (plurality opinion).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id. at 2543 (“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has
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the law was discrimination against an unpopular message such as one in
opposition to the military, not preserving an important perception.64
In another context, cases applying the “secondary effects” doctrine, courts
have treated as content-neutral and upheld speech regulations because of the
noncommunicative impact of expressive conduct—like decreasing property
value65—that seems to turn on public perceptions. The doctrine is most
frequently associated with the adult entertainment industry, where the Supreme
Court has recognized that “preserving the character of [a city’s] neighborhoods”
can justify zoning ordinances barring adult-oriented businesses.66
To take a final example with close parallels to secondary effects cases, in
American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,67 an en banc panel of
the D.C. Circuit embraced preserving the perception of food safety, framed as
“individual health concerns,” as a “substantial” interest justifying a law requiring
meat distributors to provide country-of-origin labeling (COOL).68 Again, the
perception-based interest was not barred by a categorical rule. Instead, the Court
evaluated whether the government’s interest was “substantial” under the
balancing test usually reserved for commercial speech restrictions.69 The Court
held that several aspects of the government’s interest combined to make it
“substantial.”70 One aspect was “the individual health concerns and market
impacts that can arise in the event of a food-borne illness outbreak.”71 That
interest turns primarily on public risk perceptions and their consequences.72
Despite the fact that the United States Department of Agriculture expressly did
not view COOL as providing safety benefits—imported foods and domestic foods
alike must meet the same safety standards73—the Court nonetheless credited the
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”)
(alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
64. The Court has been protective of anti-military viewpoints in the past—speech banned by the
Stolen Valor Act could have fallen into the same category. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft cards).
65. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
66. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). The secondary effects doctrine is
highly controversial and the recent Supreme Court ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert has called its
legitimacy into question. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). Nonetheless, courts have
continued to apply the doctrine, at least in the context of regulations on adult entertainment businesses.
See, e.g., BBL Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that Reed did not
“upend[]” established doctrine for regulation of businesses offering sexually explicit entertainment).
67. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
68. Id. at 23.
69. Id. (applying “substantiality” standard from Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 24 (noting that legislators thought consumers wanted to “choose American meat on
the basis of a belief that it would in truth be better”).
73. See, e.g., Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658, 2679 (Jan. 15, 2009) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“[T]he COOL program is neither a food safety or traceability program, but
rather a consumer information program. Food products, both imported and domestic, must meet the
food safety standards of the FDA and FSIS.”); see also Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 78 Fed.
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“decision to empower consumers to take possible country-specific differences in
safety practices into account” and upheld the law.74
The treatment of perceptions by speech doctrine ranges from rejection to
embracement, varying by context and the precise perception at issue. Categorical
rules preclude regulating to shape some perceptions, but not others. The next
subpart discusses one theory of First Amendment doctrine that may explain the
discrepancies.
B. Explaining The Varied Treatment Of Perceptions In First Amendment
Cases
How can the varying approaches to perception-based justifications in free
speech cases be explained? The words of the First Amendment (“Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”75) do not provide any
explanation of what the “freedom of speech” entails or a prescription for the tests
and categories that judges invoke to implement it. It does not, for example, say
that regulating to prevent offense is categorically off limits or that other “contentbased” restrictions are constitutional if they are “narrowly tailored” to advance
a “compelling” government interest. Nor does it say that certain disfavored
content-based categories of speech, like fighting words, are subject to less (or no)
First Amendment protection.76
Scholars and judges have spilled buckets of ink explaining the normative
underpinnings of the “freedom of speech” and relating those underpinnings to
judicial doctrine, resulting in various theories.77 This subpart considers
perception-based justifications against the backdrop of one such theory,
articulated most famously by then-professor Elena Kagan. Kagan theorized that
speech doctrine is oriented toward smoking out government motives that run
counter to a crucial First Amendment principle: it is impermissible to suppress
speech based on animus toward a particular viewpoint or idea.78 This theory has
appeal for many reasons, not least because, as Kagan has shown, it does a good

Reg. 31,367, 31,372 (May 24, 2013) (stating “COOL is not food safety related”).
74. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 25. Later, after the United States government conceded to the World
Trade Organization that “human health and safety are not part of the objectives pursued by the COOL
measure,” the World Trade Organization authorized $1 billion in retaliatory tariffs. Panel Report, United
States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ VII.581 WTO Doc. WT/DS384/R
(adopted Nov. 18, 2011). Congress subsequently abandoned much of the COOL regime. See Associated
Press, Meat Labeling Law Repeal Leaves Buyers in Dark About Product Origins, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4,
2016, 10:04 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/meat-labeling-law-repeal-leaves-buyersdark-about-product-origins-n489771 [https://perma.cc/8URG-JUR2].
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76. See Kagan, supra note 9, at 472–73.
77. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001)
(describing some theories).
78. Kagan, supra note 9; see also FALLON, supra note 77, at 94 (“[V]irtually all of the leading
theories [for the free speech clause] would hold it impermissible, albeit for different reasons, for the
government to attempt to stifle communication based on its hostility to particular ideas.”).
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job explaining both doctrine and outcomes.79 Moreover, this analysis
demonstrates an important point as we shift to the Second Amendment: Freedom
of speech doctrine is understood as implementing speech-specific principles and
thus may not translate to the very different context of the right to keep and bear
arms.
Understood through a motive-hunting lens, the varied treatment of
perceptions in First Amendment cases can come into focus. Regulation to
prevent offensiveness automatically raises a red flag since a person’s perception
that speech is offensive treads perilously close to forbidden animus toward
unpopular viewpoints. It thus calls for a categorical rule, and only narrowly drawn
exceptions can pass muster. One such narrowly drawn exception that the
judiciary has accepted is when an audience is relatively captive—exhibited in
Pacifica and Hill. In that limited circumstance, the government is given the
benefit of the doubt that it is acting to protect the interests of the captive listeners,
not to censor unpopular viewpoints. Restricting advocacy of violence similarly
raises a red flag. Incitement doctrine, which requires actual harm to be imminent
(not just perceived), reflects another safeguard against “motives based on
ideology.”80
In contrast, other speech restrictions seeking to shape perceptions may pose
less risk of belying ideological censorship and therefore do not require a
categorical rule. In Williams-Yulee, preserving the perception of judicial integrity
through a restriction on personal campaign solicitations by judges did not present
a significant risk of viewpoint discrimination.81 The Supreme Court did not apply
a categorical prohibition on that perception-based objective and the government
was able to defend the law under means–end scrutiny without showing any actual
connection between the campaign solicitations and corruption.
Similarly, in American Meat Institute, preserving the perception of food safety
and thereby preventing market disruptions by requiring the inclusion of factual
information about country of origin did not, under a motive-hunting explanation,
belie governmental animus toward any viewpoint. In light of experience with
market consequences when perceptions of food safety drop, the asserted
79. Kagan, supra note 9. Of course, no theory can synthesize all case law or capture all of the
Amendment’s normative underpinnings. Another conception of First Amendment doctrine is speakerbased, and “understands the primary value of the First Amendment to reside in its conferral of expressive
opportunities on would-be communicators” to enhance “autonomy” and other desirable qualities. Id. at
424. Another is audience-based and sees the primary value of the First Amendment to reside in enabling
the public audience “to arrive at truth and make wise decisions, especially about matters of public
import.” Id. Also, it is worth noting that Kagan is not the only scholar to suggest that motive hunting is
the goal of First Amendment scrutiny. Professor Jed Rubenfeld, for example, has defended a principle
for why First Amendment doctrine often is, and in his view should be, focused on rooting out illegitimate
governmental purposes: because that is the best way “to honor a simple principle” underlying the First
Amendment, that individuals have a “right to their opinion.” Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818 (2001).
80. Kagan, supra note 9, at 433, 436–37.
81. Cf. id. at 444 (“[T]he Court would treat differently a law prohibiting the use of billboards for all
political advertisements and a law prohibiting the use of billboards for political advertisements
supporting Democrats.”).
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perception-based interest was accepted as a legitimate justification for countryof-origin labeling.82
In Alvarez, the Supreme Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, though not
by way of a categorical rule preventing the government from regulating to
preserve “the public’s general perception of military awards.”83 Indeed, the Court
deemed that interest “compelling.”84 But criminalizing false statements about
receipt of military awards, the thrust of the law, was not “actually necessary” to
achieve that interest—counter-speech, for example, could suffice.85 Under a
motive-hunting explanation, the outcome in Alvarez suggests that strict scrutiny
was sufficient to smoke out the government’s viewpoint-based motive, perhaps
to suppress anti-military sentiment.86
Theories of First Amendment doctrine—like the motive-based theory—rely
on speech-centric underpinnings such as that the government “must remain
neutral in the marketplace of ideas” to explain judicial doctrine.87 The next part
considers whether the same doctrinal tests are necessary to implement the
Second Amendment and its distinct values.
IV
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
Before the Supreme Court recognized an individual Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller,88 regulating firearms
to preserve the perception of safety would present few, if any, difficulties under
the federal constitution. Similar to regulating other risks, like hazardous waste,
that objective would raise more questions of policy than of federal constitutional
law. But in Heller, the Supreme Court clarified that the judiciary must scrutinize
gun regulations more closely than it would other risk-reducing measures. The
Court established one categorical rule—the government cannot ban the
possession of handguns in the home89—but largely left the creation of judicial
doctrine on other issues to the lower courts.
This part shows how evolving Second Amendment doctrine leaves the door
open to regulating to preserve the perception of safety. Unlike the speech
context, which likely would categorically reject that objective, historical arms
restrictions and the distinct values and risks associated with the Second
82. Cases involving the secondary effects doctrine can be similarly explained. Motive analysis,
“although not answering all questions” about the doctrine, “provides the most coherent general account
of prevailing doctrine.” Id. at 472. Secondary effects doctrine can be understood as “emerg[ing] from the
view that it is relatively easy in cases involving secondary effects to isolate the role played by hostility,
sympathy, or self-interest.” Id. at 490.
83. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
87. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978).
88. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
89. Id.
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Amendment do not require the same approach. Nevertheless, relying on
perceived safety raises practical difficulties associated with a hard-to-prove and
subjective interest that will limit its applicability in many circumstances. This part
concludes by considering a few such difficulties.
A. Second Amendment Doctrine After District of Columbia v. Heller
Unlike First Amendment doctrine, Second Amendment doctrine has not
benefited from decades of Supreme Court case law. Two years after Heller, in
McDonald v. City of Chicago,90 the Supreme Court “incorporated” Heller’s
holding to apply against state and local governments.91 Then, in 2016, the
Supreme Court issued a two-page per curiam opinion rejecting the Massachusetts
Supreme Court’s conclusion that stun guns are unprotected by the Second
Amendment because they were not in common use in 1789, reasoning plainly
rejected in Heller.92 Those three cases represent the entire universe of Supreme
Court precedent since the Court articulated the individual right to keep and bear
arms.
Heller provided limited doctrinal cues to guide lower courts in subsequent
cases involving regulations less stringent than handgun bans. At first glance,
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion seems to call for an originalist analysis.
The Court set out to reconstruct how the language of the Second Amendment
would be understood by “ordinary citizens in the founding generation,”93
purporting to reject an “interest-balancing” approach.94 Based on that
reconstruction, the majority concluded that self-defense is the “core” and
“central component” of the right, but the right is not unlimited.95 Among other
things, “longstanding” firearm restrictions, like “prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” are “presumptively lawful.”96 The
majority provided a non-exhaustive list of other presumptively lawful
regulations, including “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,” “laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings,” and “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.”97 The history-focused approach in Heller, including
cautionary language regarding “longstanding regulatory measures,” was

90. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
91. Id. at 791 (incorporating Heller).
92. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016).
93. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77. Public meaning originalism posits a static interpretation of the
constitution based on “the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Amy
Guttman ed., 1997).
94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
95. Id. at 599, 630 (emphasis omitted).
96. Id. at 626–27 & n.26.
97. Id.
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repeated by the plurality in McDonald,98 and seemed to establish certain
categorical exceptions to Second Amendment coverage.
Yet, Heller also left the door open to interest balancing, such as intermediate
or strict scrutiny, by concluding that the District of Columbia handgun ban would
fail “any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights.”99 Similarly, in several places the Heller majority invoked
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence,100 which contemplates
both categorical rules and balancing tests.101
In light of the dearth of precedent and the fact that Heller and subsequent
Supreme Court cases have left “the Nation without clear standards” for
implementing the Second Amendment right,102 lower courts have developed their
own doctrine.103 After Heller, “historical meaning enjoys a privileged interpretive
role” in the Second Amendment analysis,104 but originalism has not been the
primary means of deciding cases. Rather, lower courts have coalesced around a
two-step test that involves both historical analysis and interest balancing:
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If
it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes
muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.105

Consistent with the high court’s statements about “presumptively lawful”
regulations, at step one lower courts often find that “longstanding” regulations
do not raise any Second Amendment problems.106 Otherwise, step two, “some
98. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).
99. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
100. See, e.g., id. at 635 (“Like the First, [the Second Amendment] is the very product of an interestbalancing by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew.”); id. at 595 (“Of
course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not. Thus, we
do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of
confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for
any purpose.”) (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)).
101. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
102. Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 719 (“I find it difficult to understand
the reasoning that seems to underlie certain conclusions that [the majority] reaches.”); Darrell A.H.
Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122
YALE L.J. 852, 858 (2013) (noting that the Heller majority “refuse[d] to explain how such a historycentered test may operate in litigation”).
103. But see Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1271–74 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In my
view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on
text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”).
104. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011).
105. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
106. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1253 (“[A] regulation that is ‘longstanding,’ which necessarily
means it has long been accepted by the public, is not likely to burden a constitutional right; concomitantly
the activities covered by a longstanding regulation are presumptively not protected from regulation by
the Second Amendment.”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (“[L]ongstanding limitations are exceptions to
the right to bear arms.”); see also Blocher, supra note 25, at 413 (“Heller categorically excludes certain
types of ‘people’ and ‘Arms’ from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any constitutional
protection whatsoever.”).
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form of means-end scrutiny,”107 tends to be outcome determinative. Typically, the
scrutiny applied is “intermediate,” which requires that a policy be “substantially
related” to the achievement of an “important governmental objective.”108
Most important for the purposes of this article, the analysis as it stands now
does not clearly preclude regulating to preserve the perception of safety. Indeed,
the inquiry leaves the door open for the government to assert a range of
regulatory interests to defend gun laws, one of which may be preserving
perceived safety. The next subpart discusses when this interest would arise in
practice, before exploring questions about its legitimacy.
B. Regulatory Interests And The Second Amendment
Under doctrine applied by the majority of lower courts, the government’s
interest in firearm regulation is a factor to be considered as one component of
means–end scrutiny. Justice Breyer, in his Heller dissent, predicted that “almost
every gun-control regulation will seek to advance . . . a ‘primary concern of every
government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens.’”109 That
was the interest set forth by the government in Heller110 and, true to form, has
been the interest relied upon in almost all Second Amendment cases thereafter.111
107. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
108. Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10; see, e.g., Kachalsky v. County
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (asking whether a “may issue” statute is “substantially
related” to an “important” government interest).
109. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,
1470 (2009) (“[V]irtually every gun control law is aimed at . . . preventing violent crime, injury, and
death.”).
110. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that D.C. regulation on handguns at
issue in Heller sought to advance “a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of [D.C.’s] citizens.”)
(quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755); Brief for Petitioners at 45–46, District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S.
570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
111. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 437 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013) (“New Jersey has asserted that the
interests served by the Handgun Permit Law . . . include ‘combating handgun violence,’ ‘combating the
dangers and risks associated with the misuse and accidental use of handguns,’ and ‘reduc[ing] the use of
handguns in crimes.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellees at 34, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d
426 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1150)); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (“The State
[Maryland] explains that, by enacting the handgun permitting scheme . . . the General Assembly
endeavored to serve Maryland’s concomitant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime .
. . .”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed compelling,
governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Defendants argue that the District of Columbia’s ‘good reason’/ ‘proper
reason’ requirement reasonably furthers its important governmental interest in reducing the number of
concealed weapons in public in order to reduce the risks to other members of the public and to reduce
the disproportionate use of such weapons in the commission of violent crimes.”), vacated, 808 F.3d 81
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“[San
Diego] has an important and substantial interest in public safety and in reducing the rate of gun use in
crime.”), rev’d, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Defendants’
Opposition To Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary and/or Permanent Injunction at 2, Grace v.
District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-2234) (may issue law justified by interest
in “prevent[ing] crime and promot[ing] public safety”).
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Public safety, moreover, is indisputably legitimate, “important,” and
“compelling.”112 For most gun regulations, unless they are categorically
constitutional, such as “longstanding” restrictions,113 or categorically barred, like
handgun bans,114 they are deemed constitutional under heightened scrutiny if
they sufficiently further the government’s interest in preventing injuries, deaths,
and crime.
But the fit between the government’s interest in public safety on the one
hand, and a given regulation on the other, is often in dispute. For example, one
popular regulatory scheme limits concealed carry permits to applicants who can
show some special need to carry a handgun in public.115 Most courts have upheld
these so-called “good cause” policies either as regulating conduct falling outside
the bounds of the Second Amendment,116 or under heightened scrutiny on the
basis that they sufficiently further the usual state interest—enhancing public
safety.117 But gun-rights litigants (and some judges) contest the empirical
evidence showing that “good cause” regimes actually achieve that interest. A
district judge in the District of Columbia concluded that the link was “not
conclusive.”118 “[T]here is [no] relationship, let alone a tight fit,” he wrote,
“between reducing the risk to other members of the public and/or violent crime
and the District of Columbia’s ‘good reason’/‘proper reason’ requirement.”119
That opinion was vacated and reflects a minority view that may not prevail on
appeal,120 but it raises the question whether, in circumstances where experts
dispute the safety benefits of a law or resource restraints hamper the
government’s ability to conclusively establish those safety benefits,121 any other
public interests can fill the gap. As a practical matter, it is under those
circumstances that perceived safety would, and has, come up.

112. See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97 (“As the parties agree, New York has substantial, indeed
compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”).
113. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
114. Id. at 628–29.
115. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4 (West 2017) (requiring applicant to demonstrate a
“justifiable need to carry a handgun”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00 (McKinney 2017) (requiring applicant
to demonstrate “proper cause,” interpreted to mean a “special need for self-protection,” Klenosky v.
N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
116. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
117. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 437 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97.
118. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 n.11 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated, 808 F.3d 81
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
119. Id. at 11.
120. Id. At the time of publication, cases challenging the constitutionality of the District of Columbia
permitting scheme were still pending in the Court of Appeals. See Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 167067 (D.C. Cir.); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, No. 16-7025 (D.C. Cir.).
121. As a result of an appropriations rider, the federal government’s ability to study the effect of
regulation on firearm deaths and injuries is greatly limited. See Christine Jamieson, Gun Violence
Research: History of the Federal Funding Freeze, PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA (Feb. 2013),
http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2013/02/gun-violence.aspx [https://perma.cc/6RAA-72AB].
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In Friedman v. Highland Park, the Seventh Circuit considered the
constitutionality of a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines, and
the parties vigorously disputed whether the ban actually enhanced public
safety.122 Writing for a two-judge majority, Judge Frank Easterbrook observed
that “assault weapons with large-capacity magazines can fire more shots, faster”
than other guns and then concluded that they “can be more dangerous in
aggregate.”123 The Court also considered evidence showing that assault weapon
bans “reduce the share of gun crimes involving assault weapons” and that a link
exists between “the availability of assault weapons [and] gun-related
homicides.”124 The majority discounted counterarguments that the large market
for assault weapons outside the area of the ban (Highland Park, Illinois) undercut
any safety benefit.125 Then the Court invoked the government’s interest in
preserving perceived safety:
If it has no other effect, [the] ordinance may increase the public’s sense of safety. Mass
shootings are rare, but they are highly salient, and people tend to overestimate the
likelihood of salient events. If a ban on semiautomatic guns and large-capacity
magazines reduces the perceived risk from a mass shooting, and makes the public feel
safer as a result, that’s a substantial benefit.126

Friedman was criticized on a number of grounds, not least of which was the
perception-of-safety holding.127 A dissenting judge opined that “perhaps” an
interest in perceived safety would suffice, but there was “no evidentiary basis”
for its connection to the regulation at issue.128 When the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the case, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented
and made a similar point. “If a broad ban on firearms can be upheld based on
conjecture that the public might feel safer (while being no safer at all), then the
Second Amendment guarantees nothing.”129 Again, the critique was qualified by
the fact that the Seventh Circuit relied on “conjecture” about whether the ban
actually made people feel safer.130

122. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447
(2015).
123. Id. at 411.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 411–12.
126. Id. at 412 (citing Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993)); George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127
PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 275–76 (2001); see also Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 792 (C.D. Ill.
2016) (citing Friedman for proposition that government’s interest in “alleviating the public of its fear of
gun violence” is “substantial”).
127. See sources cited supra note 8. The opinion was also criticized for departing from the two-step
test for Second Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2016),
reh’g en banc granted, 636 F. App’x 880 (4th Cir. 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
However, the discussion of perceived safety in Friedman is similar to what one might expect as part of
intermediate scrutiny at step two of the analysis.
128. Friedman, 784 F.3d at 420 (Manion, J., dissenting).
129. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
130. See id.
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But a threshold question suggested by a Fourth Circuit judge in a subsequent
case131 is whether preserving the perception of safety ever can justify a restriction
on the right to keep and bear arms. As First Amendment doctrine shows in the
context of speech restrictions, influencing some perceptions can be categorically
rejected and others accepted as legitimate grounds to regulate. In other words,
whether preserving perceived safety is valid in the Second Amendment context
may not be as simple as asking whether the public’s interest in feeling safe from
armed violence is “important” for the purposes of intermediate scrutiny.132
Because courts deciding novel Second Amendment questions have looked to
First Amendment doctrine for guidance,133 the next subpart revisits First
Amendment doctrine and how it likely would treat the public interest of
preserving the perception of safety. Then, it considers significant distinctions that
counsel against simply importing the First Amendment rules.
C. Should Preserving Perceived Safety Be Treated The Same In Second
Amendment Doctrine As It Would Under First Amendment Doctrine?
The Supreme Court has held that even speech advocating violence, which
certainly could make people perceive themselves to be less safe, must be
accompanied by imminent harm before it can be constitutionally regulated.134 It
is not a long stretch from that established rule to the conclusion that speech
generally cannot be restricted to preserve the perception of safety.
One might argue, in light of many courts’ reliance on First Amendment
doctrine to implement the Second Amendment right, that the same conclusion
should apply automatically when guns are the regulatory target.135 Yet
longstanding regulations contemplate the legitimacy of arms restrictions based
on the perception of safety in ways that the First Amendment does not, and
Second Amendment values (to the extent they are clear from Heller and
McDonald) and risks differ from First Amendment values and risks in ways that
implicate the perception of safety. Indeed, the rights are not just different, but
can be in tension. These considerations counsel against rote importation of First
Amendment rules in this context and suggest that preserving the perception of
safety may have a more legitimate place in the Second Amendment analysis.
1. Longstanding Arms Restrictions Relating to Perceived Safety
Heller emphasized the importance of “longstanding” regulatory measures,
which are presumptively valid.136 Historical analysis also may be instructive about
131. See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 182–83.
132. None of the judges considering the issue in Friedman disputed the importance of feeling safe
from armed violence. As discussed in the next part, feeling safe from armed violence has long justified
arms restrictions and can be central to enjoying other liberties, like the freedom of speech.
133. See cases cited supra note 3.
134. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
135. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L.
REV. 417, 461–64 (2014).
136. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008).
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whether the government’s interest in preserving perceived safety should be
permitted to justify firearm regulations.137 In particular, a categorical rule against
regulating to protect the sense of safety would run up against historical
restrictions, unique to the weapons context, intended to do just that.
From medieval England to early America the law governing the carrying of
weapons in public was especially attuned to perceived safety. The English Statute
of Northampton, passed in 1328 to restrict carrying weapons in public, was
intended (at least in part) to prevent fear of violence.138 In 1405, Henry IV
instructed that public carry can be prohibited “whereby . . . any of the people
[are] disturbed or put in fear.”139 More than 170 years later, in 1579, Elizabeth I
issued a proclamation urging enforcement of the public carry restriction because
“her Majesties good qu[i]et people, desirous to live in peaceable manner, are in
feare and danger of their lives.”140 In 1716, William Hawkins wrote that “where a
Man arms him[s]elf with dangerous and unu[s]ual Weapons, in [s]uch a Manner
as will naturally cau[s]e a Terror to the People,” he commits “an Offence at the
Common Law” and violates “many Statutes.”141 In 1769, William Blackstone
wrote that “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime
against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land.”142
American colonies and states similarly justified carry restrictions as a means
to prevent fear of armed violence. New Jersey and Massachusetts provide two
examples. In 1686, New Jersey enacted An Act Against Wearing Swords, &c.,
which prohibited “wearing Swords, Daggers, Pistols, Dirks, Stilladoes, Skeines,
or any other unusual and unlawful Weapons” because, among other things,
people are “put in great [f]ear.”143 Similarly, a 1790s Massachusetts law gave

137. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Testing Government Action: The Promise of Federalism, in PUBLIC
VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35, 36 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (“History can illuminate the
nature and strength of a state interest and also may suggest the degree of ‘fit’ between a challenged
regulation and its objective.”).
138. Riding or Going Armed in Affray of the Peace Act 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 1
THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (mandating that individuals “bring no force in affray of the peace,
nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in [f]airs, [m]arkets, nor in the presence of the [j]ustices or
other [m]inisters, nor in no part elsewhere, upon pain to forfeit their [a]rmour to the King, and their
[b]odies to prison at the King’s pleasure”).
139. 2 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY IV, 1402–1405 526 (A.E. Stamp ed., 1929) (issuing the
proclamation on July 16, 1405, in Westminster); see also ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, THE LAWIERS LOGIKE
EXEMPLIFYING THE PRAECEPTS OF LOGIKE BY THE PRACTISE OF THE COMMON LAWE 56 (1588)
(citing to 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.)) (noting that carrying weapons “not usually worne and borne . . . will strike
a feare into others that be not armed”).
140. BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST COMMON USE OF DAGGES,
HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUZES, CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (1579).
141. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 135 (1716).
142. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148–49 (emphasis added).
143. THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEWJERSEY 289 (Aaron Leaming & Jacob Spicer eds., 1758).
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justices of the peace the authority to arrest “such as shall ride or go armed
offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens.”144
Under the longstanding-restriction test, similar public-carry regulations—and
their baked-in fear-prevention rationale—may fall outside the protection of the
Second Amendment altogether.145 But they also are significant in that they show
a tradition of regulating to preserve a community’s perception of safety from
armed violence that is in opposition to a categorical rule barring restrictions
aimed at that same objective.
2. Second Amendment Values
First Amendment doctrine is understood to implement distinctive, speechspecific principles such as that the government “must remain neutral in the
marketplace of ideas.”146 Those principles, which can explain the treatment of
perceptions in free speech cases, do not underlie the right to keep and bear arms
and there is no reason to assume that the First Amendment’s rules are needed to
protect Second Amendment principles.
Like with the First Amendment, the words in the Second Amendment are of
limited utility for identifying underlying values, especially after Heller instructed
that the first half of the Amendment (“A well regulated Militia being necessary
for the security of a free State”)147 does not establish a militia-centric
underpinning for the right. We must look elsewhere, and another obvious place
is Heller itself, which held that the “inherent right of self-defense” is “central to
the Second Amendment right.”148
Self-defense has to be an important consideration after Heller, but its
helpfulness in deciding the boundaries of the Second Amendment is limited for
at least two reasons. First, the government has long played a significant role in
regulating both weapons and self-defense—including to preserve the perception
of safety149—the extent of which reflects an important difference between the
First and Second Amendment rights. The First Amendment assumes that the
state should not play a role in determining the content of speech. The Second
Amendment does not embody as robust an assumption with respect to weapons
and self-defense. Indeed, even while private firearm possession is protected, the
state continues to play a large role in setting the boundaries of what “arms” are

144. 1795 Mass. Acts 436. For a contemporary analysis of the statute, see 1 WILLIAM CHARLES
WHITE, A COMPENDIUM AND DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 116 (1809). Professor Saul
Cornell provides other examples in his contribution to this symposium. See Saul Cornell, The Right to
Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017.
145. See sources cited supra note 106.
146. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
148. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). In other places in the opinion, the Court
declared “self-defense” to be the “core” and “central component” of the right. Id. at 599, 630 (emphasis
omitted); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 US 742, 767 (2010).
149. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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permissible150 and what counts as lawful self-defense.151 And as Professor
Lawrence Rosenthal has discussed, the government’s regulatory authority over
the right to keep and bear arms appears on the face of the Second Amendment,
in its reference to a “well regulated Militia.”152 Of course, some extreme
regulations are categorically off limits under the Second Amendment,153 but
deciding other categorical rules based on the self-defense holding in Heller—such
as whether the government can regulate to preserve the perception of safety—is
made more difficult by the historically accepted regulatory authority that was
undisturbed by enumerating the right in the Second Amendment.
Second, as Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell A.H. Miller have recently
shown, Heller’s emphasis on “self-defense” is indeterminate, failing to resolve the
question of what precise values underlie the Second Amendment right.154 Blocher
and Miller identify three possible values: autonomy, democracy, and personal
safety. The autonomy view “is primarily concerned with the liberty of selfreliance.”155 The democracy view posits that gun rights are primarily to prevent
government tyranny.156 The personal safety view is closest to the “marketplace of
ideas” logic that animates First Amendment doctrine. It suggests that the “right
to threaten violence through the keeping and bearing of arms . . . contributes to
personal safety in roughly the same way that speech contributes to truth.”157 This
perspective is epitomized by the slogan that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy
with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”158
Indeed, of these three views, the marketplace perspective would be most
opposed to a government objective of preserving perceived safety. The
“marketplace of violence,” to provide an effective deterrent, would require that
individuals perceive the threat of armed violence. Governmental meddling to
shape perceptions about that threat would be off limits, just as ideological
censorship is when it comes to the marketplace of ideas.
Yet, all three views of the Second Amendment, in their strongest forms,
conflict not only with regulations to preserve perceived safety, but also those
150. Heller held that the Second Amendment protects arms in common use “for lawful purposes.”
554 U.S. at 624. Even this broad articulation permits significant governmental involvement—both to
regulate arms not “in common use” (thereby preventing them from becoming “common”) and to
establish what “purposes” are “lawful.”
151. As Professor Miller shows in this symposium, the boundaries of self-defense have always been
drawn by the state. See generally Darrell A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and The State, 80
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.2, 2017.
152. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case
for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1230–40 (2015).
153. Heller established one such regulation: bans on handguns. 554 U.S. at 570.
154. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental
Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 347–54 (2016).
155. Id. at 348.
156. Id. at 350.
157. Id. at 352.
158. Id. at 353 (alteration in original) (quoting Eric Lichtblau & Motoko Rich, N.R.A. Envisions ‘a
Good Guy With a Gun’ in Every School, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/22/us/nra-calls-for-armed-guards-at-schools.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3X-4KRK]).
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directly seeking to reduce actual violence, which of course is a widely accepted
rationale for arms restrictions. In other words, they each could present an
obstacle to the sorts of safety regulations long accepted as valid by the courts,
complicating any effort to use the self-defense rationale in Heller to derive a
categorical rule about regulations seeking to preserve the perception of safety. A
court would understandably hesitate before accepting, without additional
theorizing, a presumptive link between a regulation intended to preserve
perceived safety and the violation of some self-defense-related principle.159
3. Second Amendment Risks
The principles underlying the First and Second Amendments are different
and thus call for different doctrinal rules. The risks associated with the two rights
are also distinct; indeed, gun carrying and use can undermine perceived safety
and chill other liberties in ways speech does not. These risks underscore both why
firearms can have such an intense impact on perceived safety and why a
categorical rule against regulation to preserve perceived safety is less appropriate
in the Second Amendment context than speech context. Relatedly, they highlight
why a court could find this interest substantial enough to justify a weapon
restriction under heightened scrutiny.
One need not look far to find examples in which people carrying firearms
cause others to feel unsafe and chill discourse, thereby erecting barriers in the
marketplace of ideas.160 In fact, this is one of the primary reasons many people
oppose allowing concealed carry on college campuses. According to four national
organizations of teachers, professors, colleges, and universities, “[s]tudents and
faculty members will not be comfortable discussing controversial subjects if they
think there might be a gun in the room.”161 A recent survey at Kansas University
corroborated that sentiment: ninety percent of faculty indicated that allowing
concealed carry by students would make them feel less safe,162 eighty percent said
159. For this same reason, explaining Second Amendment doctrine by reference to motive analysis,
like the one Kagan argued guides First Amendment speech doctrine, see Kagan, supra note 9, is almost
impossible. Without knowing the precise values underlying the Second Amendment, we cannot derive
an illegitimate governmental motive that doctrine should “smoke out.”
160. See, e.g., Diana Reese, Moms Demonstrate for Gun Control, Armed Men Stage Counter-Protest
in Indiana, WASH. POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (Mar. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/shethe-people/wp/2013/03/29/moms-demonstrate-for-gun-control-armed-men-stage-counter-protest-in-indi
ana/ [https://perma.cc/P826-3P52] (armed demonstrators at 2013 rally in Indianapolis organized by Moms
Demand Action for Gun Sense in America); Marc Tran, Men with Guns Swell Protest Crowds Outside
Obama Meetings, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2009, 9:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2009/aug/18/gun-protests-obama [https://perma.cc/ZSL3-C3MV] (armed protestors in Phoenix on
August 16, 2009, where President Obama was speaking about healthcare reform); Igor Volsky, Men With
Loaded Rifles Intimidate Moms Gathered at Gun Safety Rally, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 28, 2013),
https://thinkprogress.org/men-with-loaded-rifles-intimidate-moms-gathered-at-gun-safety-rally-82fbcbd
00a73#.hknneiitw [https://perma.cc/B6YF-FPRD] (organizer of gun safety rally “unsettled” by presence
of armed counter-protesters and “would have to think twice before holding another event”).
161. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors et al., Joint Statement Opposing “Campus Carry” Laws (Nov. 12,
2015), http://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/CampusCarry.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS56-QRLA].
162. See GARY BRINKER, DOCKING INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, KANSAS BOARD OF REGENTS
COUNCIL OF FACULTY SENATE PRESIDENTS CAMPUS EMPLOYEES’ WEAPONS SURVEY 37 (2016)
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it would “negatively impact [their] course and how [they] teach,” and seventyseven percent believed it would “limit[] . . . academic freedom to teach the
material and engage with the students in a way that optimizes learning.”163
Similarly, legal scholars have concluded that firearms can diminish speech
protected by the First Amendment. Professor Miller observed that
the presence of a gun in public has the effect of chilling or distorting the essential
channels of a democracy—public deliberation and interchange. . . . Even if everyone is
equally armed, everyone is deterred from free-flowing democratic deliberation if each
person risks violence from a particularly sensitive fellow citizen who might take
offense.164

Professor Gregory Magarian likewise opines that firearms can “undermine
debate by fostering a climate of mistrust and fear.”165
Thus weapons, because of their potential to diminish others’ perceived safety,
may inhibit the “marketplace of ideas” protected by the First Amendment. The
right to keep and bear arms, as Justice Stevens wrote in his McDonald dissent, is
“dissimilar from [other liberty interests] in its capacity to undermine the security
of others.”166 Words can be threat-neutral, but firearms cannot.167 This distinction
explains why Heller and McDonald blessed broad restrictions on firearms that
would never apply to speech, like the complete withdrawal of Second

(“Kansas Employees’ Survey”).
163. Id. at 32. The general sentiment among faculty regarding concealed carry was also reflected in a
letter from 40 professors to the Kansas Legislature. They wrote that allowing concealed carry “will make
us and our students feel less safe,” “will compromise the open door policy many of us maintain,” and
“will make students less open to working together with others whom they may not know well.” See
University Distinguished Professors Issue Statement on Weapons Policy, K-STATE TODAY (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.k-state.edu/today/announcement.php?id=23727 [https://perma.cc/LU6Z-X7TH].
164. Miller, supra note 49, at 1309–10 (2009) (citing Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 704 (2007)) (“Whereas robust protection of free speech . . . serves
democracy, if everyone had access to howitzers and machine guns, representative democracy would likely
be harder, not easier, to achieve.”).
165. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the
Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 95 (2012). See also FIRMIN DEBRABANDER, DO GUNS MAKE US FREE?
DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMED SOCIETY 98 (2015) (“A gun fundamentally severs its bearer from the
community of his peers; it causes others to treat him with trepidation and fear—if they approach him at
all.”); Tran, supra note 160 (quoting political scientist Fred Solop of Northern Arizona University as
noting that the presence of guns at political rallies is “quite scary for many people” and “creates a chilling
effect in the ability . . . to carry on honest communication”).
166. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 894 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Bonidy
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The risk inherent in firearms . . . distinguishes
the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have been held to be evaluated under
a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination,
which can be exercised without creating a direct risk to others.”).
167. Research shows that the human brain reacts to firearms the same way that it reacts to snakes,
and quite differently than the brain reacts to threat-neutral objects. Elaine Fox, Laura Griggs, & Elias
Mouchlianitis, The Detection of Fear-Relevant Stimuli: Are Guns Noticed as Quickly as Snakes?, 7
EMOTION 691 (2007). Meanwhile, so-called “weapon focus effect” is a “well-known cognitive bias” in
which weapons “receive more fixations and longer fixations than do other hand-held objects.” Adam T.
Biggs, James R. Brockmole, & Jessica K. Witt, Armed and Attentive: Holding a Weapon Can Bias
Attentional Priorities in Scene Viewing, 75 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 1715, 1716
(2013).
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Amendment rights from certain categories of potentially dangerous people.168 At
minimum, the dynamic between “arms” and “speech”—ambivalent at best,
antagonistic at worst—counsels against rote importation of doctrinal rules
crafted to protect the “marketplace of ideas,” such as the First Amendment’s
requirement of imminent harm before advocacy of violence can be
constitutionally restricted. Further, the extremely salient risks presented by
firearms enhance the strength of the government’s interest to preserve perceived
safety through regulation.
Yet, even if the government is permitted to regulate firearms to preserve the
perception of safety, the government would still need to show that such a
regulation passes heightened scrutiny. The remainder of the article considers
some practical difficulties that could arise in that analysis.
D. Pragmatic Considerations And The Perceived Safety Rationale
Longstanding weapon regulations aimed at preserving the perception of
safety can fall outside the boundaries of Second Amendment coverage
altogether.169 If not longstanding, however, the regulation must pass muster
under heightened scrutiny, where pragmatic difficulties could arise. This subpart
discusses a few such difficulties: proving the connection between a regulation and
perceived safety; distinguishing trivial from meaningful effects on perceived
safety; dealing with baseless perceptions; and accounting for non-uniform
perceptions.
1. Proving the Connection Between a Regulation and Perceived Safety
The two dissenting opinions in Friedman highlighted the problem of proving
the connection between a regulation and the public’s sense of safety.170
Conjecture about whether a policy achieves its regulatory objective may suffice
for rational basis review, but more should be required when a constitutional right
is implicated. A related difficulty is distinguishing between trivial and meaningful
impacts on perceived safety. Even if a survey showed that 100 percent of
Highland Park, Illinois residents would feel safer if assault weapons were banned,
how much safer would they feel? And how much is sufficient to restrict the
Second Amendment right?
Courts often do not answer such questions with the rigor we desire,
“frequently adopting an astonishingly casual approach” to evaluating
government interests.171 Sometimes, for example, they simply assume a law
advances the government’s purported interest.172 But this judicial practice does
168. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
169. See sources cited supra note 106.
170. See supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.
171. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1321 (2007); see also id.
at 1322 (“Sometimes, . . . the Supreme Court labels interests as compelling on the basis of little or no
textual inquiry.”).
172. For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court did not address
the extent of the effect of a voter identification law on safeguarding voter confidence, 553 U.S. 181 (2008),
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not make it doctrinally appropriate. Litigants and courts have various tools to
support the connection between a given regulation and the asserted state interest,
including historical precedent, provable effects of the regulation, other empirics,
or (at minimum) reasoned analysis.173
The Supreme Court has accepted, for example, history and tradition as a
substitute for an empirical showing of difficult-to-measure government
interests.174 This approach may be particularly appealing in Second Amendment
doctrine, which already emphasizes the importance of history and tradition. For
example, the law has historically restricted public carry where it undermines the
perception of safety,175 and that legal history could inform the analysis of modern
restrictions that are not deemed presumptively lawful, but aimed at that same
objective.
Another approach would be to look for objectively discernible byproducts
relating to perceived safety. In the challenge to country-of-origin labeling on food
products, for example, the court considered economic impacts of decreased
public safety perceptions.176 Similarly, in the “secondary effects” cases, courts
look to tangible adverse effects related to regulated speech, such as decreased
property values.177 This tactic appears in other areas of law, too, like tort law,
which generally requires some outward showing before recovering for a
subjective harm in order to “distinguish between reliable and serious claims on
the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.”178
Litigants in Second Amendment cases could make a similar showing. The
survey of Kansas University faculty, for example, gauged the intensity of the
decrease in perceived safety if campus carry were allowed by asking faculty if
they would change the way they taught.179 In Texas, meanwhile, at least one
professor has quit because of campus carry, noting that allowing concealed carry
on campus “does scare people away; it scares me away.”180 A longtime dean
followed suit, citing campus carry as his reason for accepting employment
apparently deciding it was “almost self-evidently true,” Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014)
(discussing Crawford).
173. See Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 313–14 (2014) (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (“Without such ‘footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation,’
those asserted interests would be ‘impossible to credit’ as ‘legitimate public purpose[s],’ rather than
‘unsubstantiated assumptions’ or constitutionally proscribed objectives, such as sheer ‘animus.’”).
174. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567–68 (1991) (plurality opinion) (concluding
that “protecting societal order and morality” is a “substantial” governmental interest on the basis of
historical analysis); see also O’Connor, supra note 137, at 36 (finding that historical analysis in Barnes
“indicated that Indiana’s interest [in preventing indecency] was in fact substantial and allayed fears that
the state’s . . . statute might have been designed to suppress specific expressive conduct”).
175. See supra Part IV.C.1.
176. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976).
178. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 444 (1997).
179. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.
180. Tom Dart, University of Texas Professor Quits over State’s ‘Campus Carry’ Gun Law,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2015, 5:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/08/unversity-oftexas-professor-quits-campus-carry-gun-law [https://perma.cc/VRM3-QUR8].
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elsewhere.181 Others initiated a lawsuit against the school.182 Such empirical
evidence and anecdotes may not perfectly mirror the extent of a change in
perceived safety, but they provide a much closer approximation than mere
speculation.
2. Baseless Perceptions
Another objection, separate from measuring the change in perceived safety,
is that a shift in perceived safety may be baseless. Indeed, a major critique of
public risk perceptions generally is that they may be constrained by mental
shortcuts and cultural influences, sometimes conflicting with expert
assessments.183
One might respond that the perception of safety is itself worth preserving,
even if baseless. All things being equal, people prefer living in a community they
perceive to be safe. And perceived insecurity can lead to societal harms, such as
chilling political discourse.184
Yet, accommodating baseless safety perceptions would be a steep price to pay
for regulating an enumerated right, not to mention setting potentially dangerous
precedent.185 Thus, courts understandably will be careful with this rationale. In
practice, they may be more comfortable relying on perceived safety when there
also is empirical evidence of safety benefits of a regulation, even if the evidence
is contested. Friedman reflects that context—the Seventh Circuit turned to
perceived safety only after discussing contested evidence of the safety benefits of
an assault weapon ban.186 Under those circumstances, community perceptions of
safety could, in effect, break the tie about the actual safety benefits of the law. Of
course, limiting the role of perceived safety in this way would exclude some
situations where no empirical studies exist, a community perceives itself to be
safer with a given restriction, and the feeling is not baseless. But such a tradeoff
is nothing new in constitutional doctrine.187

181. See Matthew Watkins, UT Architecture Dean Cites Campus Carry as a Reason for Departure,
TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 25, 2016, 2:34 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/02/25/ut-architecture-dean-citescampus-carry-reason-dep/ [https://perma.cc/6J25-BHFV].
182. See Complaint, Glass v. Paxton (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2016) (No. 16-cv-845).
183. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 18; Sunstein, supra note 18.
184. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1168 (“The mere fact of fear is a social loss, in some cases a large
one, and as we have seen, fear is likely to have a range of ripple effects.”).
185. Two recent examples of discriminatory policies proposed in response to baseless safety concerns
are laws restricting bathroom access based on biological gender and a proposal to ban Muslims from
immigrating to the country. See Anne Blythe, Federal Judge Has Lots of Questions About HB2, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Aug. 1, 2016, 4:23 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article93112007.html [https://perma.cc/LA23-UPNJ]; Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump Is
Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not Rolling It Back, WASH. POST (July 24, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-rolling-it-ba
ck/ [https://perma.cc/DQF2-YP8E].
186. See supra, notes 122–126 and accompanying text.
187. See FALLON, supra note 77, at 6–7 (describing how some doctrinal tests produce an
“‘overenforcement’ of ultimate constitutional meaning”).
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3. Non-Uniform Perceptions
Another doctrinal consideration is that even if a court accepted that a
community reasonably feels safer with a given firearm regulation, that sentiment
may not be uniform across communities. Returning to the public carry example,
the University of Kansas survey shows that some communities will
overwhelmingly correlate restricting public carry with enhanced safety. A similar
correlation might be expected in metropolitan areas unaccustomed to gun culture
where “peoples’ insecurity would rise to unbearable levels if they perceived that
a good percentage of the people walking next to them on the street, sitting next
to them on a subway train, or waiting on line with them at a parking garage were
armed with a concealed handgun.”188 Other firearm-related conduct, or the
marketing of certain types of firearms (like assault weapons), may have similar
impacts on perceived safety in some places.
One would expect rural areas and communities more accustomed to guns,
however, to view regulation differently than a university or New York City. In
fact, nationwide polls show a closer divide between those who perceive safety
decreases or increases when more people carry firearms than the response
yielded by the Kansas University survey.189 Similarly, some states have loosened
concealed carry restrictions while others have tightened them, all in the name of
public safety, further evidence that communities perceive the connection
between restrictions and public safety differently.
Reliance on perceived safety to justify weapons regulation, then, could inject
geographic variability into the constitutional analysis. To what extent can, or
should, Second Amendment doctrine accommodate such local and regional
variation? Should Second Amendment doctrine be like obscenity doctrine, which
allows for regional variation in the form of “contemporary community
standards?”190 “It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound,” the Court
explained in Miller v. California, “to read the First Amendment as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”191
On one hand, such regional variation is generally disfavored in constitutional
analysis. Rights are presumed to apply uniformly. On the other hand, some
Supreme Court language, as well as the history of local and regional gun
188. JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 224 (2002).
189. Shortly after the Roseburg, Oregon mass shooting on October 1, 2015, a slight majority of
respondents in a nationwide Gallup poll said that the country would be safer if more people carried
concealed weapons. See Frank Newport, Majority Say More Concealed Weapons Would Make U.S. Safer,
GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/186263/majority-say-concealed-weapons-safer.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HJC7-4745]. Less than a year later, a nationwide Quinnipiac University poll reached
the opposite conclusion when respondents were asked a similar question: 52 percent said they would feel
less safe and 40 percent said they would feel safer if more people carried guns. See Quinnipiac University,
Overwhelming Support for No-Fly, No-Buy Gun Law, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds;
Support for Background Checks Tops 90 Percent Again (Jun. 30, 2016), https://poll.qu.edu/
national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2364 [https://perma.cc/Z44F-GMCV].
190. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
191. Id. at 32.
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regulation, suggest that Second Amendment doctrine, like obscenity doctrine,
might be an exception to the general rule. In particular, Justice Samuel Alito’s
opinion in McDonald observed that “conditions and problems differ from locality
to locality and . . . citizens in different jurisdictions have divergent views on the
issue of gun control.”192 The Second Amendment, Alito continued, does not
eliminate the “ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs
and values.”193 Moreover, given the importance of tradition in Second
Amendment analysis, permitting localized and regionalized tailoring would
accord with a long history of varying firearm regulations based on differing local
or regional security concerns.194
V
CONCLUSION
Perceptions often animate regulations and sometimes are relied upon to
defend them against constitutional challenge. The First and Second Amendments
present good case studies of this phenomenon in rights-impinging contexts. First
Amendment doctrine generally rejects the use of some perceptions, like
preventing offensiveness, as legitimate rationales for regulating speech. But other
perceptions, like the perception of the integrity of the judiciary, are fully
embraced. In the end, whether a perception will be rejected or accepted is best
explained by looking to the distinct principles underlying the First Amendment
right.
Preserving the perception of safety would almost certainly be rejected as a
justification for a speech restriction, but that does not mean it must be off the
table as a justification for a gun restriction. The applicability of First Amendment
rules in the Second Amendment context is not automatic given the vastly
different history, principles, and costs associated with the Second Amendment
right. Such differences should inform any effort to transplant doctrine from one
constitutional area to another. Indeed, perceived safety has a more legitimate
role justifying firearm regulations than speech regulations. In the end, whether
perceived safety plays a meaningful role in justifying future firearm regulations
will likely turn on whether litigants and courts can address the practical
challenges such a regulatory rationale presents.

192. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 783 (2010).
193. Id. at 785.
194. See id. at 927 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)) (“‘[P]rimarily, and historically,’ the law has treated the exercise of police
powers, including gun control, as ‘matter[s] of local concern.’”); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123
YALE L.J. 82, 90–107 (2013) (describing the longstanding American tradition of firearm localism); id. at
125–32 (discussing commentary and case law showing that incorporated constitutional rights do not
always apply uniformly across jurisdictions); Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and
Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.F. 121 (2015) (showing
how regulatory models and jurisprudence relating to firearms differed between the antebellum South
and other regions of the country).

